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Rothhaar, M. and Frewer, A. (eds.): 2012, Das Gesunde,
das Kranke und die Medizinethik. Moralische Implikatio-
nen des Krankheitsbegriffs. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
225 pages. ISBN 978-3-515-09938-7. Price € 46.00.
The concepts of illness and health are pivotal notions of
theoretical and moral justification of both medical practice
and health care policy. Establishing and exploring the
meaning and normative aspects of these concepts requires
continuing differentiated examination, especially in view
of the abundance of unprecedented therapeutic, preventive
and alternative goals arising from recent developments in
biotechnology. The volume edited by Markus Rothhaar and
Andreas Frewer meets this challenge by confronting the
theoretical controversy surrounding the concepts of illness
and health with corresponding ethical reflections, and by
revealing their epistemological and practical interconnec-
tions. Though the volume covers a wide range of issues
raised by the notions of ‘‘illness’’ and ‘‘health’’, the ques-
tion of the extent to which these concepts can and should
be conceived of as normative and as ethically relevant is a
central motif throughout the book.
The first part of the book brings together approaches
from the philosophy and history of science and from the
theory of medicine. According to the medical-historical
contribution by Daniel Scha¨fer, implicit and explicit nor-
mative ideas of illness can be traced back to classical and
early modern medical understandings of ‘‘perfect’’ and
‘‘imperfect nature’’. In the following chapter, Peter Huck-
lenbroich’s aim is to determine, in conceptual proximity to
current theoretical and practical medicine, those elements
of ‘‘illness’’ that are conceptually prior to, yet able to
integrate behavioral directives associated with ill or dis-
eased individuals. By contrast, Bernard Gert suggests that
the values associated with the experience of suffering are
anthropologically universal and allow to define an ethically
normative conception of illness or ‘‘malady’’ beyond sub-
jective and culturally relative beliefs. Similarly, central to
the accounts of health subsequently advanced, first by
Kenneth Richman and then by Lennart Nordenfelt, is the
assumption that purely descriptive attempts to define health
are necessarily deficient. However, both of these approa-
ches rely on a concept of health that owes its normative
force not to basic anthropological or intersubjective values
but to personal preferences of well-being. Thus both
accounts deem individuals as healthy or in need of medical
attention to the degree that they are able to pursue their
(self-chosen) goals, even though the range of goals that can
plausibly justify a right to assistance by third-parties may
be limited. Representative of a phenomenologically-
oriented approach to illness is the chapter by Klaus Gahl,
which outlines the main features of a ‘‘medical anthro-
pology’’ that takes into account both the objectiveness of
illness as well as the subjective character of being affected
by illness.
The second, ethical part of the book is introduced by
Petra Gelhaus who addresses the normative dimension of
‘‘illness’’, which goes beyond the mere description of ill-
ness as a deviation from normal or ideal states. The three
subsequent contributions deal with epistemological and
practical challenges for conceptions of illness that arise in
the face of recent discoveries and developments within
biotechnology. Roland Kipke reevaluates the boundaries of
medical discourse by investigating the justificatory poten-
tial of appealing to ‘‘illness’’ in ethical evaluations of
enhancement purposes. Monika Bobbert, and subsequently
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Ilona Szleza´k, discuss how predictive genetic diagnostics
and neurological imaging procedures, respectively, require
theoretical and practical adaptations within clinical
pathology. Complementing and topping off the preceding
articles, Micha Werner advances a general interpretation of
illness that allows to integrate universal ideals of justice
with individual conceptions of the good life, thus being
suitable for playing a justificatory role in regulative health
care policy.
Taking into consideration and contesting key ideas from
Anglo-American literature about the concepts of illness
and health, this volume should be considered a fruitful
reading material for medical, legal and social theorists and
practitioners alike who are interested in the vast range of
complex theoretical and ethical issues at the center of ill-
ness and health.
Nina Scherrer
Bern, Switzerland
Callahan, D. 2012, In Search of the Good: a Life in Bio-
ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 232 pages. ISBN:
978-0262018487. Price: US $29.00.
‘‘In search of the Good’’ is an autobiographical book by
Daniel Callahan, the well-known co-founder (with Willard
Gaylin) of the Hastings Center, located near New York.
The volume explores the pioneer work of the Center since
its foundation in 1969. The haven of bioethics at the end of
the 1960s was something new, unconventional, where
theoreticians could apply their knowledge, and suggest
solutions to contemporary problems. The crucial question
posed by the author at that time was: ‘‘Would it be possible
to make use of my philosophical training on a wide and
complicated range of ethical challenges posed by the
stunning medical advantages that emerged in the 1960s and
promise along with others to continue for the indefinite
future, as those challenges have?’’ His affirmative answer
to this question marked the point of departure of the
Center’s building process, which overcame several obsta-
cles, such as the scepticism showed by both philosophers
and medical doctors, and the difficulties to obtain
financing.
Daniel Callahan tells the reader about himself as a
young philosophy student who wanted to find a connection
between his field of expertise and the moral dimension of
medical advances. The introduction of medical technolo-
gies arose during these decades many ethical debates, such
as those on the role of the birth control pill in society, or
later on, on the use of embryonic stem cell in research.
The book is divided into nine sections, which represent
the fundamental steps taken by Daniel Callahan in his life
devoted to bioethics. The first chapter describes various
aspects of the author’s early life, which includes his
Catholic heritage, his passion for swimming, his wedding
in 1954 and the beginning of his preparation to be an
academic philosopher at Harvard University. The second
chapter, entitled ‘‘My Own 1960s: A Decade of Transfor-
mation’’, describes the moment when Callahan left Harvard
in order to take a job as editor of Commonweal, a journal of
opinion. In those years, the author became aware that he
did not want to be a standard university philosopher who
speaks mainly to other philosophers. Nonetheless, he
wanted to apply his background differently. Also in those
years the author lost his Catholic faith and questioned
himself about the role that religion plays in morality.
In the third chapter, ‘‘Giving Birth to a Center:
1969-1979’’, the author writes about his first idea to build a
research center on ethics in 1967. At the time of the Center’s
foundation, many physicians, educated in the era of posi-
tivism, did not believe that ethics was something more than
an expression of emotions. During the first years of activity
of the institution, the topics more often discussed included
abortion and various issues relating to genetics.
The fourth chapter, which focuses on the years
1980–1986, describes the Hastings Center as a definitively
established institution that developed activities relating to
the service industry. In those years, issues relating to
research on human subjects were at the forefront of public
discussion. An important feature of human subject research
concerned the moral status given to informed consent,
which was strictly related with autonomy, a dominant value
in American bioethics.
The fifth chapter describes the decade between 1986
and 1996, which was characterized by an incredible
growth of the Center. It not only reached economic sta-
bility but also started to edit one of the most important
bioethics journals worldwide: the Hastings Center
Report. The following chapter explores the years from
1996 to 2010, when Callahan devoted part of his time to
teach seminars of ethics and health policy at the Harvard
Medical School, starting to collaborate with the Univer-
sities of Harvard and Yale. Some points concerning the
interaction between Bioethics and University Programs
are stressed in the seventh chapter, while the eighth one
explores the relationship between bioethics and moral
values as well as various methodological approaches. In
conclusion, this volume represents an important contri-
bution to both the history of bioethics (by tracing the
birth and development of one of the first research centers
devoted to this field), and to the biography of a pioneer
bioethicist like Callahan, who never lost his will to find a
‘‘new track’’.
Cristiana Baffone
Bologna, Italy
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Pelluchon, C.: 2013, Tu ne tueras point. Re´flexions sur
l’actualite´ de l’interdit du meurtre. Paris: Cerf. 112 pages.
ISBN: 978-2-204-09997-4. Price: € 13.00.
Corine Pelluchon is a philosopher and lecturer at the
University of Poitiers, in France. In recent years, she has
made thoughtful contributions to bioethical reflection with
two important volumes: L’autonomie brise´e. Bioe´thique et
philosophie (2009) and Ele´ments pour une e´thique de la
vulne´rabilite´ (2011). The volume which is the object of this
review focuses on the prohibition of killing. This ‘‘found-
ing prohibition’’ (interdit fondateur) of every human
society, as she calls it, has a direct connection with several
bioethical controversies, especially those relating to the
beginning and the end of life.
In this small but thoughtful volume, the author claims
that the prohibition of murder makes sense even in the
absence of a belief in God or in the sacredness of human
life. The response is neither to be found in purely theo-
retical philosophy. Neither the purely rational Kantian
ethics, nor the consequentialist approaches provide a full
account of the moral wrongness of murder. Appealing to
Levinas’ philosophy, she argues that ethics emerges pri-
marily in the concrete person-to-person relationship, and
not on the level of purely theoretical knowledge. It is only
at this interpersonal level that we really understand why
murder is intrinsically wrong. According to the well-known
Levinasian expression, the ‘‘face’’ of the other silently
remembers us the command: ‘‘thou shall not kill’’ (Totality
and Infinity, p. 199). Thus, the ban on murder draws its
strength, not from a theoretical, abstract imperative, but
from my relationship to ‘‘the other’’, who totally escapes to
my power. In this regard, Levinas’ experiential approach
represents an enrichment of ethical reflection as it helps us
to better understand, from a concrete perspective, our
duties towards others, and the absoluteness of being that
every human being embodies.
Based on this perspective, Pelluchon describes murder
as the desire to annihilate the other, that is, to destroy him
or her so as to make them as if they had never existed. In
this regard, every murder is the ultimate expression of
violence; it is addressed to the other as such, to his or her
‘‘otherness’’. From this point of view, every murder is to
some extent impossible, in the sense that murderers take
for granted that they have the power to annihilate ‘‘the
other’’, but in fact, they do not have such a power.
Pelluchon also applies the prohibition of murder to our
relationship to (non-human) animals by arguing that the
absolute power that humans often exert over animals
constitutes a transgression from an ethical point of view.
However, she recognizes that the prohibition of killing has
not here the same force that in the case of humans. As she
points out, the alterity the animal is not the same as the
alterity of a human being. Only a human being is my
‘‘neighbor’’ in the full sense of the word (p. 81).
Probably the main originality of Pelluchon’s book lies in
its attempt to apply the Levinasian ethics to a number of
controversial bioethical issues, such as abortion, euthanasia
and assisted suicide, which have not been, as far as I know,
specifically addressed by Levinas himself. In this regard,
this volume represents an interesting contribution to bio-
ethical reflection from a particular perspective. The ques-
tion remains open however, whether the Levinasian
approach alone suffices to explain the wrongness of killing,
especially in those situations where an interpersonal
encounter with ‘‘the other’’ is virtually inexistent or
impossible (such as in the case of embryos, fetuses, and
patients in coma or in a persistent vegetative state). Could
it be argued –against Levinas– that in such cases ontology
precedes ethics?
Roberto Andorno
Zurich, Switzerland
Keown, J.: 2012, The Law and Ethics of Medicine. Essays
on the Inviolability of Human Life. New York: Oxford
University Press. 392 pages. ISBN 978-0-199589555.
Price: £50.00.
This recent volume by John Keown is a bijou of consis-
tency and rationality. Based on the study of numerous legal
documents and cases, it fuses passion with rigor, depth
with simplicity, complexity with clarity. From this work
emerges the professional competence of the author in the
field of the medical law and ethics: Professor at George-
town University (Kennedy Institute of Ethics), well-known
medical lawyer in the US (and in Europe too), cited for his
research by distinguished bodies worldwide (like US
Supreme Court, the Law Lords, the House of Commons,
the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics,
and the Australian Senate), Keown offers to his readers an
excellent tool and resource to think in-depth about one of
the most significant issues of nowadays: the value of
human life.
Actually, this topic is not utterly new, as Keown himself
shows through the analysis of the history of medical law.
What is new is the ‘‘anthropological question’’, which
looms large from the ‘‘biotechnological revolution’’, that
is, from the new possibilities to handle human life at the
beginning and at the end. Even though the principle of
inviolability of human life is widely recognized as a legal
principle, there are several contemporary misunderstand-
ings around it, which are real cultural pitfalls, defined as
‘‘caricatures’’ by Keown. So, the pivotal scope of this
volume is to outline this principle, freeing it from the
cultural confusions, which identify this principle with
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vitalism, or present the inviolability of life as the fruit of a
theological vision, or yet as a speciesist position.
Keown starts an ideal dialogue with the opposite view,
analyzing critically the misleading concept of ‘‘quality of
life’’, and distinguishing ‘‘worth of treatment’’ and ‘‘worth
of life’’ that is ‘‘quality of life benefits’’ and ‘‘beneficial
quality of life’’. He also focuses on the unavoidable prin-
ciple of equal dignity of all human beings, rejecting the
distinction between the notions of ‘‘human being’’ and
‘‘person’’, which he considers arbitrary. At the same time,
he sets out the principle of autonomy but without exacer-
bating it to the point of destroying one’s or another’s life.
Keown applies first of all the principle of life’s inviolability
to various legal issues relating to the beginning of life,
including the most controversial issues, such as abortion,
in vitro fertilization, the ‘‘morning after’’ pill, and frozen
embryos. Then, he applies it to the several end of life
issues, like euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, living
wills, withdrawal of tube-feeding from patients in a vege-
tative state or in minimally conscious state, and the duty to
provide palliative treatment.
The book shows the current strong cultural, social and
political pressure that leads to interpret human rights as if
their foundation were absolute self-determination, and if
people had a right to dispose of the life of the weakest and
most defenseless members of society. In this regard, I agree
with Keown that only the recognition of the inviolability of
human life from conception to natural death is able to give
a solid foundation to a theory of human rights and render
authenticity to the principle of equality.
The volume, accompanied by an extensive bibliography
and by two tables of cases and statutes, is primarily
directed at academic lawyers and practitioners of medical
law in all common law jurisdictions. However it should
also be of interest to people involved in bioethical issues
regarding the value of human life, like healthcare
professionals.
Marina Casini
Rome, Italy
Rosen, M.: 2012, Dignity: Its History and Meaning.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 176 pages.
ISBN: 978-0-674-06443-0. Price: € 18.95.
In this short book, Michael Rosen dwells on both historic and
systematic questions on where our understanding of dignity
stems from and what we mean by it today. In fact, he thinks
that these questions are inevitably interconnected, for ‘‘to
untangle dignity, the best way, I think, is to reach back to its
roots, and these […] are historical’’ (pp. 7f.).
The book is divided into three chapters. In the first,
Rosen presents various understandings of dignity that have
been developed through the history of philosophy, from
Cicero and the Stoics to Kant and Catholic ethics. He
identifies three main strands of thinking about dignity: ‘‘the
idea of dignity as status, the idea of dignity as inherent
value, and the idea of dignity as behaviour, character, or
bearing that is dignified’’ (p. 54). In the remaining chapters,
he focuses especially on the second strand and contrasts it
with his own favourite, which is revealed by the third,
namely the idea of dignity as a duty to treat people
respectfully. Rosen spends the major part of the second
chapter on criticizing views on dignity that depict it as an
‘‘inner transcendental kernel’’ (p. 9). In particular, he
argues that if we evaluate such an understanding against
real court cases, its limits quickly become obvious. For one
thing, such a view cannot make sense of the absolute
inviolability enjoyed by dignity: Although practices like
dwarf-tossing violate the dignity of small people, there
seem to be no good reasons to ban them, provided they are
done with the explicit and autonomous consent of the
people affected (p. 69). Likewise, a deontological under-
standing of dignity as an inviolable value overriding all
other claims leads to problems in cases where conflicts
within its sphere of protection arise: Rosen considers a
German court decision which condemned torturing a kid-
napper even though the life of his victim was in danger. He
rejects several alternatives that defend the prohibition to
violate the kidnapper’s dignity as justified even against the
dignity claims of his victim. In the third chapter, Rosen
seeks to show how his conception of dignity as respect-
fulness can solve the puzzle of why we should not only
treat the living, but also dead human beings in a dignified
manner. Rosen suggests to interpret our duties to these as
part of adopting ‘‘an attitude of respect’’, which urges us to
‘‘act in ways that are expressive of this attitude’’ (p. 143).
This attitude as grounded in an idea of dignified behaviour
is linked to duties ‘‘that all of us have simply by being
human’’ (p. 141).
Rosen’s book is to be appreciated for his appealing
account of dignity that aims to occupy some middle ground
between status conceptions of dignity (as recently defended
by Jeremy Waldron) and those that interpret dignity as
some kind of absolute value. Likewise, his interpretation of
Kant is refreshing in clearly setting aside what he calls
‘‘voluntarist’’ (p. 89) accounts of Kantianism and carefully
exploring Kant’s own commitments to the philosophical
tradition (e.g. pp. 23f.). It would have been interesting,
though, to learn more about the possible connections
between dignity as status, value, and attitude. Rosen con-
fines himself to a couple of hints about the different
functions performed by the various conceptions of dignity.
He states, for instance, that the status-conception of dignity
‘‘is not capable of playing a constructive role in helping us
to identify a specific bundle of human rights as
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fundamental’’ (p. 61), a function he mainly assigns to
dignity as intrinsic value. This is remarkable insofar as his
account of dignity as respectfulness allows the conclusion
that ‘‘there are at least some times when it is proper to
abandon dignity or even to attack it’’ (p. 73), e.g. when
greedy and corrupt politicians are caricaturized as pigs.
This appears to suggest that while Rosen’s account of
dignity might capture important ways how the notion is
used, it misses out on others also firmly established in our
society, namely ways that point to a form of personal
dignity we would not allow to be overruled so easily.
Sebastian Muders
Zurich, Switzerland
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